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It is when merchants dispute about their own rules that they
invoke the law.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The observation of Justice Brett holds as true today as it did in
the nineteenth century.
During the course of contract
negotiations, modern businesses frequently incorporate alternative
2
dispute resolution (“ADR”) provisions into their agreements as a
† J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2008; B.A. English,
North Dakota State University, 1988.
1. Robinson v. Mollett, 7 App. Cas. 802, 817 (1875) (Brett, J., dissenting).
2. ABC’s of ADR: A Dispute Resolution Glossary, 10 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIGATION 115, 115 (1992) [hereinafter Glossary]. The most prevalent forms of
ADR are the minitrial, mediation, med-arb, and arbitration. Id. at 115-16. The
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3

way to settle conflicts without court involvement.
One of the primary forms of ADR is arbitration. Arbitration is
generally described as “[a] method of dispute resolution involving
one or more neutral third parties who are usu[ally] agreed to by
4
the disputing parties and whose decision is binding.” Parties
prefer arbitration because it is less costly and less formal than
5
litigation.
Additionally, arbitration offers simpler rules, more
flexible scheduling, and less disruption of dealings between
6
parties.
7
The arbitration process itself can take on a variety of forms.
The most common are binding arbitration and non-binding
8
arbitration. Binding arbitration involves selection by the parties of
a neutral person or panel of three persons to hear the dispute and
9
offer a final decision or award. During the process, the parties
10
may establish their own rules of evidence and procedure. Under
binding arbitration, awards are usually enforceable by the courts
11
The process for non-binding
and not subject to appeal.
12
arbitration is similar to that used in binding arbitration.
The
major difference is that the neutral’s conclusion is merely advisory
13
and may be used by the parties for future negotiations.
However, inclusion of an arbitration provision in a contract
does not guarantee the parties will use arbitration to resolve their
minitrial consists of two distinct processes. Id. at 116. First, parties exchange
information and have an opportunity to hear the strong and weak points of their
case and the cases of the other parties. Id. An attorney for each side then presents
an abbreviated version of the case to representatives for each side who possess
settlement authority. Id. The parties may then turn to negotiation, using a
neutral advisor if desired. Id. Mediation is a voluntary and less formal procedure
where the adversarial parties choose an impartial third party to help them reach a
settlement. Id. Decisions reached in mediation are not binding, but rather serve
to facilitate the process of negotiation. Id. Med-arb is an abbreviation for
mediation-arbitration. Id. In med-arb, the parties pursue mediation, but agree to
arbitrate any disputes not initially settled in mediation. Id. For a description of
arbitration, see text infra Part I.
3. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 1 (2000).
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 79 (7th ed. 2000).
5. Glossary, supra note 2, at 115.
6. National Arbitration Forum, Arbitration, http://www.arbforum.com/
arbitration/index.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
7. Glossary, supra note 2, at 115.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/8

2

Johnson: Case Note: Contracts—Into the Void: Minnesota Limits Application
JOHNSON(CB & CKI).DOC

2004]

11/14/2004 6:05:34 PM

INTO THE VOID

581

dispute. When a conflict arises over the use of arbitration, one of
14
the parties will often turn to the judiciary for relief.
In Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, the Minnesota Supreme Court
recently examined an arbitration agreement in the context of a
15
broader business lease. A specific provision in the lease provided
16
for resolution of disagreements through arbitration.
After a
dispute arose under the contract, the parties argued over whether
the conflict should be resolved under the arbitration clause or in
17
court.
18
Arbitration provisions are generally considered binding, and
a significant body of authority exists supporting their
19
enforcement. Minnesota courts also hold a strong presumption
20
However, a
in favor of enforcing agreements to arbitrate.
legitimate issue can be raised regarding these provisions. If the
14. See Developments—The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1851, 1863
(2000) [hereinafter Developments]. This type of dispute is common in business
arrangements. Once a conflict arises, parties often argue over whether the
problem should be handled by an arbitrator or heard in court. The answer
depends on the wording of the arbitration clause, the type of dispute, and the
jurisdiction that controls. See infra Part II.
15. 669 N.W.2d 344 (2003).
16. Fiber Optic Lease Agreement between Onvoy, Inc. and SHAL, LLC (Oct.
25, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Fiber Optic Lease]. See also discussion
infra Part III (explaining terms of the lease).
17. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 347.
18. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Section 2 holds a written agreement to arbitrate a
dispute involving commerce “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
Id. The U.S. Code is applicable here because the dispute between Onvoy and
SHAL is governed under federal law. See discussion infra Part II.
19. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (2000); see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995) (holding an arbitration award should be enforced
“within the scope of the contract”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (stating “questions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration”); David
L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1991)
(noting “federal policy strongly favors arbitration as an alternative dispute
resolution process”).
20. Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Minn. 1995). In
Johnson, the supreme court noted that when considering a dispute over whether
the parties agreed to arbitrate, Minnesota courts should resolve any questions in
favor of arbitration “whether the problem at hand is the construction of the
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.” Id. at 795 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25); see also Heyer v.
Moldenhauer, 538 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (indicating where
there is reasonable debate over the use of arbitration, the court should forward
the issue to arbitration); 3 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Arbitration and Award § 1.00 (5th
ed. 2000) (stating “[a]rbitration is a proceeding favored in the law”).
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overall agreement itself does not exist, can a contract provision
mandating arbitration still be valid? In Onvoy, the Minnesota
Supreme Court crafted a solution that provides a balanced answer
to this question.
This note first gives a brief overview of arbitration use in the
21
22
United States. It then discusses the Onvoy decision and provides
23
an analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling. Finally, the
note concludes that the court’s holding properly weighs
Minnesota’s strong presumption in favor of arbitration against the
24
need to allow access to the courts.
II. HISTORY
A. Background
Many businesses now employ arbitration as a primary form of
25
dispute resolution. Arbitration is viewed as more streamlined and
26
Arbitration clauses are particularly
less costly than litigation.
common in commercial contracts involving construction, health
care, entertainment, telecommunications, intellectual property,
27
and technology.
However, arbitration as a form of dispute
resolution has existed in America since the earliest days of
28
settlement. During both the Dutch and British colonial periods,
merchants frequently resorted to arbitration as a faster and less
29
Use of arbitration also
expensive form of dispute resolution.
provided a less adversarial environment that favored continuing,
30
mutually beneficial business relationships.
As early as the
seventeenth century, businessmen in New York and Philadelphia
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1855.
26. See 70 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 3d § 379 (2003); Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer
D. Henderson, Arbitration and Judicial Civil Justice: An American Historical Review and
a Proposal for a Private/Arbitral and Public/Judicial Partnership, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 141, 179 (2002) (arguing that arbitration costs should be reasonable and
proportional to the amount at stake to allow access to the system).
27. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1855-56.
28. Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes
on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 481-82
(1995) [hereinafter Benson, Development of Arbitration].
29. Id. at 481.
30. Id. at 482.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/8

4

Johnson: Case Note: Contracts—Into the Void: Minnesota Limits Application
JOHNSON(CB & CKI).DOC

2004]

11/14/2004 6:05:34 PM

INTO THE VOID

583

began using arbitration as commerce developed between those
31
The New York Chamber of Commerce formed the
cities.
country’s first permanent independent board of arbitration in
32
1768.
As the nation continued to expand, so did the use of
33
arbitration. Mormons, as well as Chinese and Jewish immigrants,
used arbitration instead of the courts as a response to perceived
34
hostility from the broader community. Minnesota acknowledged
35
the existence of arbitration in its earliest state laws.
The U.S. Supreme Court first took a favorable view toward
36
arbitration in Hobson v. McArthur. Hobson involved a dispute over
37
the appraisal of land. The parties agreed to use three neutral
appraisers as arbitrators to determine the value of a specific
38
When only two of the three arbitrators provided an
property.
39
estimate, the plaintiff brought suit.
The Court stated in
interpreting the agreement, “we must look at what was the obvious
intention of the parties. The parties clearly intended, that the
40
valuation should, at all events, be made.” The fact that the third
appraiser did not render an opinion was not sufficient to override
41
the parties’ intention to arbitrate.
As a result, with Hobson the Court indicated arbitration
provisions should be construed according to the intention of the
42
parties. The ruling served notice on lower federal courts to stop
searching for reasons to overturn arbitration awards on procedural
43
grounds.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Burchell v. Marsh took things a

31. Id.
32. Ed Anderson & Roger Haydock, History of Arbitration as an Alternative to
U.S. Litigation, WEST’S LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 12, 1996, available at 1996 WL 449743
[hereinafter Anderson & Haydock, History of Arbitration].
33. Benson, Development of Arbitration, supra note 28, at 481.
34. 4 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 3, § 1.
35. MINN. STAT. ch. 96, § 1 (1851). “All controversies which might be the
subject of personal action at law, or of a suit in equity, may be submitted to the
decision of one or more arbitrators in the manner provided in this chapter.” Id.
36. 41 U.S. 182 (1842).
37. Id. at 188.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 190.
40. Id. at 193.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 192-93.
43. Benson, Development of Arbitration, supra note 28, at 485-86.
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44

step further.
In Burchell, a creditor sought reversal of an
45
arbitration award favoring a debtor. The Court upheld the award:
Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the
matters submitted to them, finally and without appeal. As
a mode of settling disputes, it should receive every
encouragement from courts of equity. If the award is
within the submission, and contains the honest decision
of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the
parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error,
either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a
substitution of the judgment of the chancellor in place of
the judges chosen by the parties, and would make an
46
award the commencement, not the end, of litigation.
Burchell recognized that upholding the decision of an arbitrator
47
respected the parties’ intent under their contract.
B. Modern Application
Congress formally recognized arbitration when it passed the
48
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925. Prior to passage of the
FAA, Federal courts had acknowledged arbitration agreements as
49
an option, but viewed them as having no real force under the law.
Parties who wished to avoid agreements to arbitrate needed to
merely refuse to proceed under the agreement, as courts would
50
generally not order specific performance of the contract.
Additionally, the party obtaining an award under an arbitration
51
clause was by no means guaranteed to receive it. The losing party
would often contest the award in court through protracted
52
litigation. Furthermore, courts in the United States continued to
show reluctance toward private dispute resolution, even if the
44. 58 U.S. 344 (1854).
45. Id. at 346.
46. Id. at 349.
47. Id.
48. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). “The FAA was Congress’ response to the
reluctance of federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements.” Andre V. Egle,
Back to Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Manufacturing Co.: To Challenge an
Arbitration Agreement You Must Challenge the Arbitration Agreement, 78 WASH. L. REV.
199, 199 (2003).
49. Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265, 270 (1926) [hereinafter Cohen & Dayton, New Arbitration Law].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 271.
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53

parties had agreed on that course. That all changed with passage
of the FAA. The new law “reversed the hoary doctrine that
agreements for arbitration are revocable at will and are
54
unenforceable.”
The FAA solidified the validity of arbitration
provisions and “place[d] arbitration agreements on par with other
55
contracts.”
Also in the 1920s, several states passed arbitration statutes at
56
the urging of arbitration groups and bar associations.
Interestingly, attorneys advocated passage of the laws in order to
57
provide a place for themselves in the ADR process. Many feared
increasing use of arbitration would exclude them from their
traditional dispute resolution activities, which would lead to
58
reduced income. Tailoring arbitration laws to facilitate attorney
59
involvement guaranteed their continuing inclusion in the system.
In addition to encouraging attorney participation, the new statutes
directed courts to recognize the validity of arbitration agreements
60
and arbitration awards.
Minnesota followed this trend by
61
adopting the Minnesota Arbitration Act (“MAA”) in 1957. Similar
to the FAA, the MAA strongly advocates the use and validity of
62
arbitration agreements.
With the development of arbitration statutes by so many
jurisdictions, conflict between state and federal arbitration laws was
inevitable. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in
63
Southland Corp. v. Keating. In Southland, several 7-11 franchisees
53. Anderson & Haydock, History of Arbitration, supra note 32.
54. Cohen & Dayton, New Arbitration Law, supra note 49, at 265.
55. Anderson & Haydock, History of Arbitration, supra note 32.
56. Benson, Development of Arbitration, supra note 28, at 481. The states
included New York (1920), New Jersey (1923), Oregon (1925), Massachusetts
(1925), Pennsylvania (1927), and California (1927). Id. Congress’ final version of
the FAA nearly mirrors the New York and New Jersey arbitration statutes. Cohen
& Dayton, New Arbitration Law, supra note 49, at 269.
57. Benson, Development of Arbitration, supra note 28, at 491-92.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 497.
61. MINN. STAT. § 572.08 (2002).
62. Id. The MAA states,
[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or
a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy
thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
Id.
63. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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brought an action for fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of
64
contract against their franchisor. The California Supreme Court
held the franchisees’ claims could be heard under state arbitration
65
law. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, and stated the FAA was
controlling and served to preempt state laws that attempt to limit
66
enforcement of arbitration provisions.
Nevertheless, a number of states continued to overlook
67
Southland and apply their own laws to arbitration disputes. Many
jurisdictions looked to a loophole distinction of language in
68
contracts either “involving” or “affecting” interstate commerce.
Inevitably, the Supreme Court provided the definitive jurisdictional
69
solution in the 1995 case Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson. In
Terminix, a homeowner sued an extermination company for
inadequate termite removal and damage repair under their service
70
contract.
The exterminator invoked the contract’s arbitration
clause, and asked for a stay to allow arbitration to proceed under
71
Section 2 of the FAA. The lower court denied the stay, and the
72
Alabama Supreme Court upheld the denial. The supreme court
reasoned the FAA only would apply if the parties, at the time of
73
contract formation, “‘contemplated substantial interstate activity.’”
64. Id. at 1.
65. Id. at 2.
66. Id. at 15-16. In its opinion, the Court noted,
[t]he interpretation given to the [Federal] Arbitration Act by the
California Supreme Court would therefore encourage and reward forum
shopping. We are unwilling to attribute to Congress the intent, in
drawing on the comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to
create a right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the right
dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum in which it is
asserted. And since the overwhelming proportion of all civil litigation in
this country is in the state courts, we cannot believe Congress intended to
limit the Arbitration Act to disputes subject only to federal-court
jurisdiction. Such an interpretation would frustrate congressional intent
to place “[an] arbitration agreement . . . upon the same footing as other
contracts, where it belongs.”
Id. at 15 (internal citation omitted).
67. See discussion infra Parts II-III.
68. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
69. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
70. Id. at 268-69.
71. Id. at 269.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354, 355
(Ala. 1993) (quoting Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287
F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961)), cert. granted, 510 U.S. 1190 (1994), rev’d by 513 U.S.
265 (1995)).
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While Terminix was a multi-state firm, the court felt the parties
74
anticipated a local and not an interstate transaction. The U.S.
Supreme Court disagreed. In its decision, the Supreme Court
effectively preempted state law by holding the FAA applied to all
transactions involving or affecting interstate commerce, regardless
of whether the parties contemplated interstate commerce at
75
contract formation. From that point on, the FAA would govern
any arbitration agreements relating to interstate commerce
76
transactions throughout all fifty states.
A major issue that occurs in arbitration cases is interpretation
of the arbitration clause as it relates to contract formation. Parties
frequently clash over whether arbitration language aimed at
resolving disputes “arising under” the agreement can be used to
arbitrate questions regarding formation of the agreement itself.
Several courts have stated the wording is in fact broad enough to

74. Terminix, 513 U.S. at 269.
75. Id. at 273-74. Specifically, the Court stated:
[W]e conclude that the word “involving” is broad and is indeed the
functional equivalent of “affecting.”
For one thing, such an
interpretation, linguistically speaking, is permissible. The dictionary
finds instances in which “involve” and “affect” sometimes can mean about
the same thing. For another, the [FAA]'s legislative history, to the extent
that it is informative, indicates an expansive congressional intent.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
The Court continued with:
[A] broad interpretation of this language is consistent with the Act’s
basic purpose, to put arbitration provisions on “the same footing” as a
contract's other terms. Conversely, a narrower interpretation is not
consistent with the [FAA]'s purpose, for (unless unreasonably narrowed
to the flow of commerce) such an interpretation would create a new,
unfamiliar test lying somewhere in a no man's land between “in
commerce” and “affecting commerce,” thereby unnecessarily
complicating the law and breeding litigation from a statute that seeks to
avoid it.
Id. at 275 (internal citation omitted). The Court had previously taken the position
that states were required to apply the FAA when state law conflicted with federal
law. See Southland discussion supra Part II. Many states disagreed with Southland,
and in an effort to preserve state arbitration laws and limit the reach of the FAA,
twenty state attorneys general joined respondent’s request to overturn the
Southland decision in Terminix. Terminix, 513 U.S. at 272; Bryan L. Quick,
Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems Corporation: Is the Montana Supreme Court
Undermining the Federal Arbitration Act?, 63 MONT. L. REV. 445, 454 (2002).
76. Despite the Terminix ruling, both the district court and the court of
appeals applied state law in reaching their decisions concerning the dispute
between Onvoy and SHAL. Onvoy, Inc., v. SHAL, LLC, Nos. C7-02-621, C7-02-702,
2002 WL 31371961 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2002), rev’d, 669 N.W.2d 344 (Minn.
2003); see discussion infra note 132.
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77

cover formation issues. For example, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
a manufacturer and a business owner entered into an agreement
for the purchase of three business enterprises and their associated
78
trademarks. The parties then argued over whether their dispute
involving an attempt to rescind the contract due to fraud should be
79
heard in court or under the arbitration clause.
The Supreme
Court determined the arbitration clause encompassed questions of
80
The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
formation.
81
Battaglia v. McKendry. In Battaglia, a conflict arose between family
82
Specifically, the
members concerning settlement of a trust.
parties disputed whether the arbitration provision contained in a
settlement agreement was broad enough to cover questions
83
concerning formation of the underlying agreement itself. Again,
the court determined the arbitration clause could address contract
84
formation.
C. The Prima Paint Doctrine
Another issue can arise when one party seeks to use the courts
instead of an existing arbitration agreement to settle a dispute.
The most prominent example of this occurred in Prima Paint Corp.
85
In Prima Paint, two
v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.
corporations from different states entered into a consulting
86
agreement. The consulting agreement contained an arbitration
87
clause. After a year of operating under the contract, Prima Paint
77. See cases cited infra notes 78, 81.
78. 417 U.S. 506, 507 (1974).
79. Id at 506.
80. Id. at 519-20. The Court stated, “[W]e hold that the agreement of the
parties in this case to arbitrate any dispute arising out of their international
commercial transaction is to be respected and enforced by the federal courts in
accord with the explicit provisions of the [Federal] Arbitration Act.” Id.
81. 233 F.3d 720 (2000).
82. Id. at 722-23.
83. Id. at 722.
84. Id. at 727. The court stated inclusion of phrases such as “arising under”
and “arising out of” in arbitration provisions should be allowed “broad
construction, and are generally construed to encompass claims going to the
formation of the underlying agreements.” Id.
85. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
86. Id. at 396.
87. Id. at 398. The clause stated “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration”
in New York City and “in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the
American Arbitration Association . . . .” Id.
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contended that F & C had breached their agreement when Prima
88
Paint discovered that F & C intended to file bankruptcy. Prima
Paint brought suit against F & C, alleging it had misrepresented its
solvency, which in turn fraudulently induced Prima Paint to enter
89
into the contract.
90
The case was originally heard in U.S. District Court.
Concurrent with filing of its complaint, Prima Paint also petitioned
the district court for an order enjoining F & C from proceeding to
91
arbitration. F & C filed a countermotion asking the court to stay
92
The court granted F & C’s
proceedings pending arbitration.
motion, and held a charge of fraud in the inducement of a contract
containing such a broad arbitration clause should be heard by an
93
arbitrator, not the court. Prima Paint appealed. The court of
appeals affirmed, and indicated a claim of fraud in the inducement
of the contract generally, as opposed to the arbitration clause
94
specifically, should be heard by arbitrators, not the courts. The
court reasoned arbitration clauses are severable from the rest of the
95
contract.
After considering the evidence, the Supreme Court
96
affirmed.
The major impact of the Court’s ruling in Prima Paint came in
its reinforcement of the idea that arbitration clauses are severable
97
from the rest of the contract under the FAA. In considering the

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 262 F. Supp. 605
(D.C.N.Y. 1966).
91. Id. at 607.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 315, 317 (2d Cir.
1966).
95. Id. The court of appeals looked to the decision in Robert Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909
(1960), in which it was noted:
[t]hat the Arbitration Act envisages a distinction between the entire
contract between the parties on the one hand and the arbitration clause
of the contract on the other is plain on the fact of the statute. Section 2
does not purport to affect the contract as a whole. On the contrary, it
makes “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” only a “written provision in
any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction . . . .”
Id. at 409-10.
96. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967).
97. Id. at 403-04.
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terms of the FAA, the Court stated:
Under § 4, with respect to a matter within the jurisdiction
of the federal courts save for the existence of an
arbitration clause, the federal court is instructed to order
arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that “the making
of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
(with the arbitration agreement) is not in issue.”
Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the
arbitration clause itself—an issue which goes to the
“making” of the agreement to arbitrate—the federal court
may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language
does not permit the federal court to consider claims of
98
fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.
Continuing with its opinion, the Court indicated, “[w]e hold,
therefore, that in passing upon a § 3 application for a stay while the
parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues relating to
99
the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.”
As a result, in order to bypass an arbitration agreement and
have a dispute heard in court, the party seeking court intervention
must allege a problem with the arbitration provision itself, not the
100
underlying contract.
This idea has become known as the “Prima
101
Paint doctrine.”
III. THE ONVOY DECISION
A. Facts
Onvoy, Inc. (“Onvoy”) is a privately held Minnesota
102
It was founded in 1988 by sixtytelecommunications company.
five local telephone providers for the purpose of supplying better
103
access to long distance service.
SHAL, LLC (“SHAL”) is a
Minnesota company comprised of three local telephone service
104
providers who are each shareholders in Onvoy. SHAL builds and
98. Id.
99. Id. at 404.
100. Id. at 403-04.
101. See, e.g., Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 100 (3d Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he arbitration clause is severable from the contested agreement under the
doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co.”).
102. Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344, 347-48 (Minn. 2003).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 348.
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maintains fiber optic telecommunications transport systems,
105
SHAL is also a “segment
primarily for SHAL companies.
106
provider” for Onvoy.
Segment providers supply one portion of
the transmission capacity Onvoy needs to route long distance traffic
107
from local providers to Onvoy.
In May 1999, Onvoy sought bids from fifty local telephone
providers for a new fiber optic network running from Plymouth to
108
Moorhead, Minnesota.
For cost purposes, Onvoy planned to
109
lease the network rather than constructing and owning it. Along
with two other segment providers, SHAL submitted a bid for
110
Onvoy’s project.
The deep interconnection between Onvoy and SHAL was
evident during formation of the deal. Three of the defendants,
who were also respondents in this case, served on boards or
committees at both companies, and were active in the negotiation
111
of the agreement at issue. Walter Clay served on both the boards
of directors at Onvoy and SHAL, and served on the Finance and
112
Audit Committee at Onvoy.
Robert Eddy served on both
companies’ boards of directors, as well as Onvoy’s Network
113
Committee. SHAL employee Darrell Westrum served on Onvoy’s
Network Committee, as did Tom Dahl, the general manager of one
114
of SHAL’s member service providers.
During its negotiations with SHAL, Onvoy sought outside
115
investors for the project.
In September 1999, two investment
companies of financier George Soros purchased 50,000 shares of
116
As a result, Onvoy amended its
Onvoy stock for $50,000,000.
articles of incorporation to allow the Soros shareholders to elect
117
three Onvoy board members.
Under the amended articles, at

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 28, Onvoy (Nos. C7-02-621, C7-02-702). The other two
bidders, Val-Ed Joint Venture, LLP, and Central Transport Group, LLC, were also
shareholders in Onvoy. Pl. Am. Compl. at ¶ 16.
111. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 348.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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least one of the Soros directors would have to approve transactions
that involved contracting with an affiliate or entering or amending
118
any material contract.
In October 1999, Onvoy and SHAL executed a ten-year lease
119
The lease
for construction and use of the fiber optic network.
contained the following provision:
Mediation and Arbitration. Any unresolved disputes arising
under this Lease shall first be submitted to mediation.
Unless the dispute is resolved after consultation between
the liaisons of each party, a mediator shall be selected by
agreement of the chief operation officers of each party.
In the event that a dispute cannot be resolved by
mediation, then the parties agree that the dispute shall be
submitted to arbitration under the rules of the American
120
Arbitration Association.
In November 2001, Onvoy sought rescission of the lease,
claiming it was several times more expensive than the going market
121
price. Onvoy also claimed that defendants Clay, Eddy, Westrum,
122
Furthermore, Onvoy
and Dahl breached their fiduciary duties.
alleged that the defendants made material misrepresentations to
induce Onvoy to enter the lease, as well as negligently
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Fiber Optic Lease, supra note 16. SHAL argued the rules of the American
Arbitration Association (“AAA”) should govern the arbitrability question under
the terms of the contract. Respondent’s Brief at 5, Onvoy (Nos. C7-02-621 & C7-02702). SHAL pointed out under AAA Rule R-8(b):
[T]he arbitrator shall have the power to determine the existence or
validity of a contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part. Such an
arbitration clause shall be treated as an agreement independent of the
other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitrator that the contract
is null and void shall not for that reason alone render invalid the
arbitration clause.
Id. The Onvoy court did not accept this argument. 669 N.W. 2d at 354; see also
discussion infra Part III.
121. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 349. In its Amended Complaint, Onvoy alleged,
[t]he decisions and assumptions utilized in creating the benchmark cost
resulted in overly high lease prices for the benefit of defendants, not
Onvoy. The formula imposes on Onvoy the costs of ownership but does
not give the benefit of ownership. Onvoy bore 100% of the cost of
construction despite the fact that the lessors installed some of their own
fibers and despite the fact that if Onvoy had constructed the facilities
itself, it would not have done so without at least one partner to share the
costs of construction with.
Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 35(d).
122. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 349.
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123

misrepresented the lease terms and the bidding process.
In
support of its position, Onvoy argued that the parties never formed
an agreement because the actions of SHAL and its representatives
124
constituted a prohibited interested-director
and ultra vires
125
transaction.
An interested-director transaction is a form of conflict of
126
interest. A director is usually prohibited from “representing both
himself and his principal in a transaction in which their interests
127
are adverse and antagonistic.” In Minnesota, courts can review a
transaction if one party claims the other did not act in a “fair and
128
reasonable” manner.
Ultra vires transactions are usually deemed invalid if they
129
exceed the corporation’s authority to make an agreement.
However, an ultra vires transaction could be considered valid if it is
within the power of the corporation, even though the transaction
130
itself may be irregular or unauthorized.
B. The Court’s Analysis
Appellate courts’ standard of review for arbitrability questions

123. Id.
124. An interested director is one involved in a corporate transaction where he
or she may have a personal interest. See Possis v. Cont’l Machs., Inc., 425 N.W.2d
286, 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
125. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1235 (7th ed. 2000) (defining an “ultra vires
transaction” as one that is “[u]nauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or
granted by a corporate charter . . . .”). Onvoy claimed an improperly constituted
board approved the transaction with SHAL. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 349.
126. In general,
a director may not pursue his own interests in a manner that is injurious
to the corporation. Directors must use the authority given them solely for
the benefit of the corporation and its stockholders and may not enter
into contracts that will bargain away the independent judgment that they
are bound to exercise in the interest of the corporation and all of the
stockholders. Directors owe stockholders an active duty of honesty and
good faith in the transaction of the business of the corporation and in
their dealings with it.
9 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Corporations § 7.09 (5th ed. 2003).
127. 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1732 (2000). Overall, a director does not
have the right to work on behalf of the corporation in any transaction “in which
he is . . . interested in obtaining any advantage at the expense of the corporation,
and he cannot act as or for an adverse party to the transaction.” Id.
128. MINN. STAT. § 302A.255 (2002); see also discussion infra Part III.B.
129. 9 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Corporations § 6.00 (5th ed. 2003).
130. Id.
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131

is de novo.
The Minnesota Supreme Court examined the issues
and determined that the FAA applied because the case involved
132
interstate commerce. The court then addressed whether Onvoy’s
133
A void
claims would make the lease void or merely voidable.
contract is not a contract at all; instead it is a “promise” or
134
“agreement” that is void of legal effect.
A voidable contract is
generally valid, but one of the parties has the power to avoid the
agreement due to incapacity, breach of warranty, or fraud, duress,
135
or mistake at formation.
SHAL argued that, under the Prima Paint doctrine, questions
of contract validity could only be addressed by courts if they dealt
136
with the arbitration clause itself, not the entire agreement. SHAL
pointed out that neither the Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit
had adopted a distinction between void and voidable contracts, and
137
therefore neither should the Minnesota Supreme Court.
The
court disagreed, and stated that the question of whether a valid
lease ever existed could be heard by a court and was sufficient to

131. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 88 v. Sch. Serv. Employees Union Local 284, 503
N.W.2d 104, 107 (Minn. 1993) (“[T]his court's review of the determination of
arbitrability is de novo.”).
132. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 350-351. The court cited Terminix in its reasoning.
Id. at 351. Onvoy affected two Minnesota cases used by the lower courts: Atcas v.
Credit Clearing Corp., 292 Minn. 334, 197 N.W.2d 448 (1972), and Thayer v. Am.
Fin. Advisers, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 599 (Minn. 1982). Atcas held (1) a party would not
be compelled to arbitrate if the arbitration clause did not cover fraud in the
inducement, and (2) arbitration was not proper when one party sought recission
of the contract. 292 Minn. at 347-48, 197 N.W.2d at 456. Thayer stated federal law
did not encompass the contract at issue, because the language of the FAA applied
only to transactions “involving” and not “affecting” commerce. 322 N.W.2d at 60304. Onvoy overruled Atcas to the extent it conflicted with Terminix. Onvoy, 669
N.W.2d at 351. Onvoy also vacated Thayer, because the Supreme Court in Terminix
had removed the involving/affecting distinction and stated the FAA applied to all
transactions in any way related to interstate commerce. Id.; see also text supra Part
II (explaining Terminix decision).
133. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 353-55.
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. a (1981).
135. Id. cmt. b.
136. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 352-53 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967)); see also discussion supra Part II.C
(describing the Supreme Court ruling in Prima Paint).
137. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 353. The court stated it had previously considered
the void/voidable distinction under Minnesota law. Id. In Dvorak v. Maring, the
court indicated it had held on numerous occasions that “without the signatures of
both spouses a conveyance of homestead property is not merely voidable but is
void and the buyer acquires no rights whatsoever.” 285 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Minn.
1979).
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138

override the arbitration clause.
Specifically, the court held
“parties may not be compelled to arbitrate claims if they have
139
alleged that the contract at issue never legally existed.” The court
further indicated, “allegations that a contract is void may be heard
by a court, even if not specifically directed to the arbitration clause,
while allegations that a contract is voidable must be sent to
140
arbitration.”
After resolving this issue, the supreme court turned to Onvoy’s
specific claims. The court determined SHAL’s actions did not rise
141
to the level of an ultra vires transaction. Minnesota recognizes an
ultra vires transaction as one within the corporation’s powers, but
142
with “some irregularity or defect in the actual exercise of power.”
Onvoy claimed it did not properly approve the lease because a
majority of the Onvoy board and one of the Soros directors did not
143
vote on the transaction, thus making it ultra vires.
However,
144
Minnesota law would presume the contract valid, even if Onvoy
145
approved the transaction with an improperly constituted board.
The court held the board’s actions would at most make the lease
146
voidable, not void.
A voidable lease would be subject to
arbitration under the arbitration clause; a void lease would require
court involvement because no lease or arbitration clause would
147
exist. As a result, the court ruled Onvoy’s claim would be subject

138. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 354.
139. Id.
140. Id. The court based its decision on Sandvik AB v. Advent International
Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 107-08 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[N]o arbitration may be compelled in
the absence of an agreement to arbitrate.”); see also discussion infra Part IV.A.2
(explaining the Sandvik decision).
141. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 355.
142. Bell v. Kirkland, 102 Minn. 213, 219, 133 N.W. 271, 273 (1907). Bell
outlined two types of ultra vires transactions. Id. at 218, 113 N.W. at 273. The first
type involved “a contract which is not within the scope of the powers of a
corporation to make under any circumstances, or for any purposes.” Id. The
second type related to contracts within the powers of the corporation, but with
some problem or flaw in the use of the corporation’s power. Id. at 219, 113 N.W.
at 273. The supreme court in Onvoy felt the dispute between the parties most
closely resembled the second type of ultra vires transaction. 669 N.W.2d at 355.
143. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 354; see also supra Part III.A (describing
configuration of the board).
144. “The . . . performing by a corporation of an act . . . if otherwise lawful, is
not invalid because the corporations was without the power to . . . perform the
act.” MINN. STAT. § 302A.165 (2002).
145. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 355.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 354.
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148

to arbitration under the ultra vires theory.
Regarding the interested-director transaction, the court noted
the burden was on SHAL to show the lease was not void from
149
inception.
Under Minnesota law, SHAL would need to offer
proof it satisfied one of four safe harbor provisions to demonstrate
the transaction was in fact valid and not void as an interested150
director transaction. The Onvoy court indicated in order to prove
the lease was valid, SHAL must show one of the following:
(1) that the transaction was fair and reasonable to the
corporation at the time it was approved; (2) that material
facts about the contract and the directors’ interest were
fully disclosed and the contract was approved in good
faith by at least two-thirds of the disinterested corporate
shareholders; (3) that material facts about the contract
and the directors’ conflicts were known by a board or
committee who authorized the transaction without the
vote of interested directors; or (4) that the contract is a
151
distribution, merger, or exchange.
If SHAL succeeded in showing the agreement met one of the
safe harbor provisions, Onvoy’s claims would be sent to
152
If SHAL failed, the lease would be considered void,
arbitration.
153
The court remanded
and Onvoy would be allowed to litigate.
154
this question to the district court for further consideration.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ONVOY DECISION
A. Conflicting Views of the Circuits
Two opposing schools of thought exist regarding application
of the Prima Paint doctrine. Federal circuits are split over whether
the question of contract formation invalidates an arbitration clause
155
Understandably, the
contained in the disputed agreement.
parties in Onvoy took opposite positions on this issue.
The crux of the conflict between Onvoy and SHAL hinges on
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 355.
Id.
See MINN. STAT. § 302A.255 (2002).
669 N.W.2d at 355-56.
Id. at 356.
Id.
Id.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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the distinction between void and voidable contracts. SHAL, in
following Prima Paint, argued the arbitration provision contained in
156
the disputed contract applied in resolving the conflict.
Under
157
SHAL’s theory, the overall contract would be viewed as voidable.
A voidable contract allows one of the parties to rescind the
158
agreement due to fraud, duress, or mistake at contract formation.
Disputes under a voidable contract remain subject to arbitration,
however, because the existing contract, not the valid arbitration
provision contained in the contract, would be the focus of
159
debate.
Conversely, the decisions favoring Onvoy’s position reflect a
modified approach to Prima Paint. In those cases, questions of
whether a contract was void would also affect the validity of the
160
arbitration provision.
Under this theory, if no contract exists,
161
neither does the arbitration clause contained in the contract.
The Minnesota Supreme Court considered both positions in
reaching its decision in Onvoy.
1.

Circuits Following Prima Paint

Many courts consider the concept of severability of arbitration
clauses
controlling
over
disputes
involving
arbitration
162
Prima Paint represents the primary reasoning
agreements.
behind this philosophy: unless specifically challenged on its own,
163
the arbitration provision will control in any contract dispute.
Several federal circuits follow this reasoning and have ruled
164
For example, the Fifth Circuit examined the
accordingly.
156. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 352-53.
157. Id. at 353-54.
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 134, at cmt. b.
159. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 353-54.
160. See cases discussed infra Part IV.A.2.
161. Id.
162. See cases cited infra Part IV.A.1 and note 164.
163. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04
(1967).
164. See text infra Part IV.A.1; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Courtney
Enters, 270 F.3d 621, 624-25 (8th Cir. 2001) (“In deciding whether to compel
arbitration,” Prima Paint directs courts to “consider whether there was fraud in the
inducement of the arbitration clause” but not the “underlying contract.”); Ferro
Corp. v. Garrison Indus., 142 F.3d 926, 933 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that, under
Prima Paint, once the court determines “the agreement to arbitrate has not been
fraudulently induced, all other issues falling within that agreement are to be sent
to arbitration”); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 749 (5th Cir.
1996) (“Because [plaintiff’s] claim relates to the entire agreement, rather than just
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enforceability of an arbitration clause in Robert Lawrence v.
165
Comprehensive Business Services Co. Plaintiff Lawrence purchased a
license allowing him to use the name of defendant Comprehensive,
166
an accounting service.
The franchise agreement contained an
167
After execution of the contract, Lawrence
arbitration clause.
found out the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy had taken
action against other Comprehensive franchisees for operating an
168
accounting business under a trade name.
In fear of losing his
license, Lawrence informed Comprehensive he could no longer
169
perform under their franchise agreement.
Lawrence then
brought suit to have the contract rescinded, claiming it was illegal
170
under Texas law.
Comprehensive brought a motion to stay
litigation and compel arbitration under terms of the franchise
171
The district court ruled for Comprehensive and
agreement.
172
Lawrence appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed, indicating
the arbitration provision was binding despite Lawrence’s claim the
173
The court also reinforced Prima
underlying contract was illegal.
Paint, and stated any challenges to arbitration must be directed at
the legality of the arbitration provision itself, not the contract as a
the arbitration clause, the FAA requires that her claims be heard by an
arbitrator.”); R.M. Perez & Assoc., Inc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“If the fraud relates to the arbitration clause itself, the court should adjudicate
the fraud claim.” However, if the fraud claim “relates to the entire agreement,
then the Federal Arbitration Act requires that the fraud claim be decided by an
arbitrator.”); C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette
Sec. Corp., 912 F.2d 1563, 1567 (6th Cir. 1990) (Prima Paint mandates “[i]f the
arbitration clause is not at issue, then the arbitrator will decide challenges to the
contract containing the arbitration clause.”); Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71, 75 (4th
Cir. 1989) (holding when a party alleges defects in formation of a contract
containing an arbitration provision, and the “alleged defects pertain to the entire
contract, rather than specifically to the arbitration clause, they are properly left to
the arbitrator for resolution”).
165. 833 F.2d 1159 (1987).
166. Id. at 1160.
167. Id. at 1161.
168. Id. at 1160.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1161.
171. Id. The arbitration provision provided in part “[a]ny controversy arising
out of, or relating to, this agreement . . . including any claim for damages or
rescission . . . shall be settled by arbitration . . . .” Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1162; see also Mesa Operating Ltd. P’ship v. La. Intrastate Gas Corp.,
797 F.2d 238, 244 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding arbitration clause in gas sales contract
enforceable despite claim contract was void from inception due to parties’ failure
to follow state law concerning such sales).
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174

whole.
The Sixth Circuit also examined this issue in Burden v. Check
175
Into Cash of Kentucky, LLC.
Burden involved an action by a
bankruptcy trustee for three estates against a creditor of those
176
Plaintiffs in Burden claimed the defendant, under the
estates.
guise of a check-cashing company, loaned money at usurious rates
177
in violation of federal and state law.
Under the scheme,
customers would provide the company with a check for a specified
178
amount.
The company would then give the customer a sum of
179
The company kept the
cash less than the amount of the check.
180
difference as a “service fee” or “finance charge.” The transaction
required customers to execute a “loan agreement,” indicating the
181
customer would pay back the cash to the company in two weeks.
182
The loan agreement contained an arbitration clause.
After plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy, their trustee brought this
183
action.
When plaintiffs sought class certification, defendant
moved to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims and stay litigation
184
pending arbitration.
The district court denied defendant’s
185
The court of appeals vacated
motion, and defendant appealed.
the district court’s decision, and remanded on the question of
186
arbitrability.
In explaining its decision, the court noted under
Prima Paint, a dispute over fraud in the inducement of the entire
187
contract is for an arbitrator, not a court, to decide.
174. Robert Lawrence, 833 F.2d at 1162.
175. 267 F.3d 483 (2001).
176. Id. at 486.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 487. The arbitration clause stated,
To pursue any claim, demand, dispute or cause of action . . . arising
under this Agreement or the transaction in connection with which this
Agreement has been executed, the claimant must submit to the other
party in writing an explanation of the claim and a demand that the claim
be resolved by arbitration.
Id.
183. Id. at 486.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 485-86.
187. Id. at 491. Specifically, the court indicated, “a challenge based on fraud
in the inducement of the whole contract (including the arbitration clause) is for
the arbitrator, while a challenge based on the lack of mutuality of the arbitration
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The Fourth Circuit followed a similar course in Snowden v.
188
CheckPoint Check Cashing. In circumstances that paralleled Burden,
Snowden, the plaintiff, executed several “deferred deposit”
189
transactions with defendant check-cashing company.
The
defendant provided cash to plaintiff, with the understanding
190
plaintiff’s check would not be negotiated until a later date. One
of the agreements memorializing a specific deferred deposit
191
Snowden later
transaction contained an arbitration provision.
brought suit against CheckPoint, claiming its deferred deposit
transactions were in fact loans that violated state and federal
192
statutes.
CheckPoint moved to compel arbitration and stay any
193
court proceedings.
The district court denied the motion, and
194
The court of appeals vacated the district
CheckPoint appealed.
195
In a
court decision and remanded for further proceedings.
reference to Prima Paint, the court indicated a party seeking to
avoid or stay arbitration must challenge the arbitration clause itself,
196
not the underlying contract.
2.

Circuits Taking a Modified Approach

Despite other jurisdictions’ decisions to the contrary, certain
federal circuits have taken a modified approach to Prima Paint.
Those circuits allow a court to decide the fundamental issue of
whether the parties ever formed a binding contract, even if the
197
contract at issue contains an arbitration provision.
Under this
clause would be for the court.” Id. (quoting Matterhorn v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d
866, 868 (7th Cir. 1985)).
188. 290 F.3d 631 (2002).
189. Id. at 633.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 634.
193. Id. at 635.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 637, 639.
196. Id. at 636. In its decision, the court noted,
The law is well settled in this circuit that, if a party seeks to avoid
arbitration and/or a stay of federal court proceedings pending the
outcome of arbitration by challenging the validity or enforceability of an
arbitration provision on any grounds that “exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract” [under 9 U.S.C. § 2], the grounds “must
relate specifically to the arbitration clause and not just to the contract as
a whole.”
Id. (quoting Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999)).
197. See cases cited infra Part IV.2; see also Camping Constr. Co. v. Dist. Council

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/8

22

Johnson: Case Note: Contracts—Into the Void: Minnesota Limits Application
JOHNSON(CB & CKI).DOC

2004]

11/14/2004 6:05:34 PM

INTO THE VOID

601

approach, challenging the existence of the overall contract would
also bring the arbitration clause into question.
The Ninth Circuit issued one of the most prominent decisions
on this issue in Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F. Hutton &
198
Company, Inc. Plaintiffs in Three Valleys were comprised of several
199
governmental entities.
Plaintiffs opened trading accounts with
200
As part of
defendant E.F. Hutton, a securities investment firm.
the transaction, the parties executed a client agreement that
201
contained an arbitration clause.
Two years after opening the
accounts, plaintiffs brought suit against Hutton, claiming
202
Hutton
investment losses due to Hutton’s wrongful conduct.
203
filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay court proceedings.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion to compel and argued the client
agreement with Hutton was void because the signatory did not have
204
the power to bind plaintiffs. The district court ruled the question
of whether the signatory had authority should be decided by an
205
206
The court of appeals reversed.
arbitrator, not the court.
Hutton had argued Prima Paint applied to the making of the entire
207
contract, not just the agreement to arbitrate.
The court of
appeals disagreed, and interpreted Prima Paint as restricted to
“challenges seeking to avoid or rescind a contract—not to challenges
going to the very existence of a contract” that one of the parties
208
“claims never to have agreed to.”
Consequently, the court held
of Iron Workers, 915 F.2d 1333, 1340 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating “[t]he court must
determine whether a contract ever existed;” otherwise, “there is no basis for
submitting any question to an arbitrator”); Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge
Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 54-55 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding a trial is warranted “to
determine whether or not an agreement was reached and, if so, whether said
agreement properly included an agreement to arbitrate”); Interocean Shipping
Co. v. Nat’l Shipping and Trading Corp., 462 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1972)
(indicating “if the making of the [contract] was in issue . . . the district court
should have proceeded to trial of this question” before compelling arbitration).
198. 925 F.2d 1136 (1991).
199. Id. at 1137.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1138. The arbitration clause provided “all controversies which may
arise between us concerning any transaction or . . . performance or breach of this .
. . agreement between us . . . shall be determined by arbitration.” Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1137.
207. Id. at 1140.
208. Id.
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the party contesting the existence of a contract containing an
arbitration clause “cannot be compelled to arbitrate the threshold
issue of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate” because “[o]nly a
209
court can make that decision.”
The Third Circuit provided another significant decision on the
210
arbitrability issue in Sandvik AB v. Advent International Corp.
Sandvik involved an attempt by an American equity investment firm
211
to purchase subsidiaries of a Swedish manufacturing company.
The parties executed a sales agreement that included an
212
arbitration provision. When the equity firm, Advent, indicated it
did not see itself as bound by the agreement, the manufacturer,
Sandvik, sued for fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of
213
contract. Advent then moved to compel arbitration, arguing that
under the Prima Paint doctrine, the arbitration clause contained in
214
the sales agreement was severable from the rest of the contract.
Sandvik asserted it could not be forced into arbitration if no
215
The district court agreed with
agreement to arbitrate existed.
216
Sandvik, and the court of appeals affirmed.
In its holding, the
court indicated “no arbitration may be compelled in the absence of
217
an agreement to arbitrate.”
The Second Circuit also examined the question of arbitrability
under a group of disputed contracts in Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd. v.
218
Clarendon National Insurance Co.
Plaintiff, a reinsurer, and
defendant, an insurance carrier, executed six reinsurance
219
agreements through their agents.
The reinsurance agreements
contained arbitration clauses that provided for arbitration of
220
disputes.
Sphere Drake became unhappy with the terms of the
221
To avoid
contracts and brought a declaratory judgment action.
209. Id. at 1140-41.
210. 220 F.3d 99 (2000).
211. Id. at 100.
212. Id. at 101. The arbitration provision dictated mandatory arbitration for
“[a]ny dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement . . . .” Id.
213. Id. at 101-02.
214. Id. at 100-01.
215. Id. at 101.
216. Id. at 100-01.
217. Id. at 107-08.
218. 263 F.3d 26 (2001).
219. Id. at 28.
220. Id. The arbitration clause in each contract provided, “[d]isputes between
the parties arising out of this Reinsurance which cannot be resolved by
compromise . . . shall be submitted to arbitration.” Id.
221. Id. at 27-28.
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arbitration, Sphere Drake asked the district court to declare the
222
agreements void because its agent had exceeded his authority.
The district court held the dispute was subject to the contracts’
arbitration clauses because, under Prima Paint, a party seeking to
avoid arbitration must allege a problem with an arbitration clause
223
specifically, not the overall contract.
The court of appeals
224
In its holding, the
reversed with respect to one of the contracts.
court noted Sphere Drake had presented sufficient evidence that
its agent did not have the authority to enter into the disputed
225
contract.
That evidence would show the contract was void, and
would also put the entire contract, including the arbitration
provision, “in sufficient issue as to warrant a trial on the question
whether the arbitration clause in the [disputed] contract is
226
enforceable.”
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court Has Taken the Proper Stance on Prima
Paint with the Onvoy Decision
In addressing the fundamental question of contract formation,
the Minnesota Supreme Court properly distinguished the issue in
Onvoy from the issue in Prima Paint. In the Prima Paint decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court operated from the presumption that an
227
By contrast, the Onvoy court took a
agreement already existed.
228
step back and looked at the formation of the agreement itself.
Prima Paint focused on fraud in the inducement of the
229
The Supreme Court reasoned that because the
contract.
underlying contract was in question, not the validity of the
arbitration provision contained in the agreement, the arbitration
230
clause should govern in resolving the contract dispute.
In
reaching this decision, the Court determined the arbitration clause
231
was severable from the rest of the contract.
Unless the
arbitration clause itself was challenged, an arbitrator, not a court,
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
(1967).
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 28, 32.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401-02
Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344, 352 (Minn. 2003).
388 U.S. at 398.
Id. at 403-04.
Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 8
JOHNSON(CB & CKI).DOC

604

11/14/2004 6:05:34 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2
232

would resolve any disputes arising under the agreement.
As a general principle of contract, a claim of fraud in the
233
inducement makes an existing agreement voidable, not void. If a
contract is voidable, the aggrieved party can rescind at his or her
234
Under Prima Paint, recission of the contract itself
discretion.
would leave the uncontested arbitration clause intact and
235
controlling over any disputes.
Conversely, Onvoy presents a different fact situation. Onvoy
argued it could not be bound by the arbitration provision because
236
the underlying lease containing the provision was void.
A void
237
contract is an agreement with no legal effect. Consequently, any
provision contained in the agreement, including an arbitration
238
clause, would also have no effect. Accordingly, even if the parties
initially intended to arbitrate, that intention would be based on a
239
valid (i.e., not void from inception) agreement to arbitrate.
Armed with this distinction, the court sought guidance from other
jurisdictions. Notwithstanding broad arbitration clauses, several
federal circuits have allowed disputes to proceed to trial if the
240
plaintiff claims the original agreement is void.
Specifically, the
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, with their decisions in Sphere
Drake, Sandvik, and Three Valleys, respectively, all support the
position that a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate under a
241
disputed contract containing an arbitration provision. The court
232. Id.
233. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 7 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.22 (rev. ed. 2002).
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 134, at cmt. b.
235. See 388 U.S. at 403-04.
236. Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344, 352, 354 (Minn. 2003).
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 134, at cmt. a.
238. As one prominent legal scholar noted, “[i]f a contract includes an
arbitration agreement, and grounds exist to revoke the entire contract, those
grounds would also vitiate the arbitration agreement.” RICHARD A. LORD, 21
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:14 (4th ed. 2001); see also 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 11:2 (West Group rev. ed., 2002) (“[A] valid arbitration agreement
cannot arise out of a broader contract if no broader contract ever existed.”).
239. The Onvoy court held “allowing courts to retain jurisdiction over credible
claims that a contract is void, leaves room for [parties] to escape obvious abuses of
power in contracting.” 669 N.W.2d at 352.
240. See cases cited infra note 241.
241. Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 263 F.3d 26, 32 (2d
Cir. 2001) (if one party to a contract alleges the contract is void and can establish
evidence supporting that position, then that party “need not specifically allege that
the arbitration clause in that contract is void, and the party is entitled to a trial on
the arbitrability issue . . . .”); Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 107-08
(3d Cir. 2000) (stating that the non-existence of an underlying contract means a
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found this rationale persuasive and adopted its holding based on
242
those circuits’ decisions.
The ruling in Onvoy fits well with Minnesota’s judicial
principles. On the one hand, the strong presumption in favor of
243
arbitration is retained.
Onvoy will be compelled to arbitrate if,
on remand, the district court finds the actions of the SHAL
defendants did not constitute an interested-director transaction
244
and thus did not render the lease void.
On the other hand, as
Justice Paul Anderson’s concurrence points out, the Onvoy decision
reflects the court’s strong belief in the right of access to the judicial
245
system.
Here, because the parties disputed the very existence of
the lease (and by extension, the arbitration clause contained in the
lease), the supreme court properly held the district court should
246
resolve the issue of contract formation.
The Gilbert concurrence also acknowledges the Minnesota
view of a balance between the role of the courts and the use of
247
arbitration.
However, Justice Gilbert also urges caution toward
valid arbitration provision does not exist; accordingly, “no arbitration may be
compelled in the absence of a [valid] agreement to arbitrate.”); Three Valleys
Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 1991) (a
party challenging the “making of a contract containing an arbitration provision
cannot be compelled to arbitrate the threshold issue of the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate.”). Contra cases cited supra note 164.
242. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 353-54. The Onvoy court also examined other cases
where courts have jurisdiction when one party disputes the existence of a contract.
Id. In Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., a securities trading company tried to
compel arbitration under a customer agreement. 957 F.2d 851, 853 (11th Cir.
1992). The account holder claimed no agreement existed because she had never
signed a contract with the securities company. Id. The court held the facts of the
case were sufficient to put the making of the arbitration agreement at issue, which
therefore required court involvement “to determine the validity of the customer
agreements before compelling [plaintiff] to submit her securities claims to
arbitration.” Id. at 855. The Eighth Circuit considered a similar issue in I.S. Joseph
Co. v. Mich. Sugar Co. 803 F.2d 396 (1986). A disagreement arose over whether
one party to a commercial contract could be compelled to arbitrate with an
assignee who was not the original party who agreed to arbitrate. Id. at 398-99. The
court of appeals held the question of the existence of a contract between the
parties must be decided by the district court, and remanded for a ruling on that
issue. Id. at 400.
243. See sources cited supra note 20.
244. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 356.
245. Id. at 358-59 (“[W]hen a right as fundamental as the right of access to the
courts and trial by jury is at stake, waiver of that right is not to be lightly
presumed.”) (Anderson, Paul, J., concurring).
246. 21 LORD, supra note 238, § 57:14.
247. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 359 (Gilbert, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
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the use of ADR in general. The impartiality of mediators and
arbitrators is often suspect, due to their close ties to the industries
248
they serve. Additionally, arbitration decisions are not required to
249
To address these issues,
conform with the existing rule of law.
and in support of the supreme court’s overriding view of the
primacy of the judiciary, Justice Gilbert recommends evaluation of
both the state and federal arbitration systems “so that they may
250
carry the same integrity that we require from our courts.”
All in all, the impact of Onvoy should not be overwhelming on
the courts. Unless a major flaw in contract formation is alleged,
most disputes will probably proceed to arbitration as agreed.
However, the court did consider the possible effects of this
decision, and offered guidance for those entering into future
arbitration agreements. If the parties desire jurisdiction of a court
rather than an arbitrator on specific issues, they should expressly
251
state that intention in the contract.
That way, in the event of a
dispute, additional disagreements can be minimized.
V. CONCLUSION
A number of jurisdictions now limit the application of Prima
252
With the
Paint when a conflict arises over contract formation.
Onvoy decision, Minnesota has joined these ranks. The reasoning
behind this movement is solid and sounds in the very foundations
of contract law: how can an arbitration provision be enforced if it’s
253
part of an agreement that may not exist?
The Minnesota
Supreme Court recognized this question, and provided a balanced
solution in Onvoy. Arbitration is a significant part of the business
landscape in Minnesota, but enforcement of arbitration provisions
under all circumstances does not apply. Going forward from
Onvoy, parties can expect their day in court if their contract dispute
involving arbitration crosses the line from the voidable into the
void.

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 352.
See cases cited supra note 241.
See sources cited supra note 238.
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